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NOTES
FINES AND FINING - AN EVALUATION
Modern concern with the ancient problem of the adequacy of prison
facilities, plus doubt of the rehabilitative and deterrent effects of even model
penal institutions,' dictates a re8valuation of alternative sanctions. Chief
among them historically have been conditional liberty and the fine.- The
former has been the object of constant criticism and study; 3 the latter has
received little consideration in the English-speaking world.4 The primary
purpose of this Note is to focus attention upon the fine in order to make a
preliminary judgment as to whether it can be used rationally as a sanction
or whether it is only the makeshift of criminal penalties, as has been
charged.5
THE FINE AUTHORIZED
Present statutory authorizations of the fine as a sanction for major
offenses may be divided into two general classes: as alternatives to imprison-
ment and as additions to imprisonment. Typical of the former group are
the Pennsylvania provisions, which allow the court to impose a fine as the
sole penalty for almost all serious crimes except murder in the first degree.6
Typical of the latter group are the California provisions, 7 which impose
fixed or indeterminate sentences of imprisonment for almost all serious
crimes but also allow the imposition of fines up to $500 for misdemeanors
and $5,000 for felonies.8 Statutes of some jurisdictions, such as New
York, rarely provide for fines in serious offenses even as additional punish-
ments.9 Federal provisions are similar to the Pennsylvania type, except
that they do not permit substitution of fine for imprisonment in as many
serious offenses.' 0
1. See 5 ATT'y GEN. SURVEY RELEASE PROCEDURES 35 (1940).
2. Ruck, Developments in Crime and Punishment in PENAL REroPM IN ENGLAND
1 (2d ed., Radzinowicz and Turner ed. 1946).
3. See, e.g., listings in KUHLMAN, GUIDE TO MATERIAL ON CRIME AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE §§ 12180-12519 (1929) ; and in TAr, CRImINOLOGY 601 (1950).
4. It has been suggested that the continent has been preoccupied with the fine
because courts there have little discretion in sentencing. Seagle, Fines in 6 ENcYc.
Soc. Sci. 249, 250 (1937).
5. Coddington, On Having a Fine Time, 115 JusT. P. 370, 371 (1951).
6. For example: murder in the second degree may be punished, in the discretion
of the court, solely by a fine varying in amount from one cent to $10,000, even though
the maximum penalty is $10,000 and twenty years. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701
(Purdon 1945). Also punishable solely by fine are id. § 4201; rape, id. § 4721 ; arson,
id. §4905; burglary, id. §4901; and one species of kidnapping, id. §4725. See
MAcNEILLE AND KESSLER, PENALTIES FOR CRIMES IN PENNSYLVANIA. (3d ed. 1952).
7. See CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering 1949).
8. Id. § 672.
9. See N.Y. PEN. LAW.
10. Among the crimes against the United States which may be punished by fine
alone are arson, 18 U.S.C. § 81 (1946) ; certain forms of espionage, id. § 791 et seq.;
(1013)
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As would be expected, statutory authorizations of the fine as a penalty
for less serious felonies and for misdemeanors are even more comprehensive,
especially in those jurisdictions in which the fine either cannot be imposed
for major offenses or else can be imposed only as an additional punish-
ment. Thus, there may be a penalty of fine alone for infractions ranging
in gravity from involuntary manslaughter,:" petit larceny,'2 and adultery 13
through mailing lottery tickets 14 or intoxicating liquor '5 to selling unmanu-
factured, adulterated horse manure.'6 However, it is relatively infrequent
for the fine to be the sole permissible penalty for violation of a state law.
Pennsylvania, in keeping with its statutory policy of allowing great dis-
cretion to the sentencing judge in choosing between fines and prison terms,
generally provides imprisonment and/or fine for minor offenses. Both
New York and California have similar provisions.'1 In addition, fines are
commonly authorized as penalties for violation of ordinances, the munic-
ipality being granted by the state the power to fine and/or imprison. s
It is apparent from the foregoing sketch that fines may be imposed
frequently, if the court desires, not only for minor offenses but also as sole
or additional penalties for major felonies.
THE FINE ACTUAL
Although it has been estimated that fines constitute 75% of all sen-
tences, 19 there are no comprehensive statistical compilations to buttress the
estimate. Despite repeated emphasis on the need for national criminal
statistics, no centralized information on the subject is available.20 The last
comprehensive report on fines was published by the Bureau of the Census
in 1910.21 Judicial Criminal Statistics for 1936 show that fines without
imprisonment constituted 21.1% of all sentences in thirty states and 5.8%o
of all sentences for fifteen major offenses in the same area.2 2 Variations
in the use of the fine as the sole penalty for the identical offense in different
jurisdictions were as follows: liquor laws, 0.7%-50.2%; driving while
mail fraud, id. § 1341-42; white slavery, id. § 2421 et seq.; counterfeiting and forgery,
id. § 471 et seq.; as well as violations of the antitrust laws, 28 STAT. 570 (1894),
37 STAT. 667 (1913), 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1946); the Motor Carrier Act, 49 STAT. 564
(1935), as amended, 54 STAT. 928 (1940), 63 STAT. 488 (1949), 49 U.S.C. §322
(1951) ; and the Pure Food and Drug Act, 52 STAT. 1043 (1938), as amended, 65
STAT. 649 (1951), 21 U.S.C. §333 (Supp. 1952).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (1946).
12. N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 1299, 1937.
13. CAL. PEN. CODE § 269a (Deering 1949) ; N.Y. PEN. LAW § 102.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (1946).
15. Id. § 1716.
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 85, 89 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
17. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1937; CAL. PEN. CODE § 19 (Deering 1949).
18. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 3451 (Purdon 1931). Some courts have
held that a pecuniary penalty imposed for violation of a municipal ordinance technically
is not a fine. See, e.g., State v. Hamley, 137 Wis. 458, 119 N.W. 114 (1909).
19. MICHAEL AND ADLER, INsTrIUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY AND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
479 (1932) ; SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 572 (4th ed. 1947).
20. See Frankel, Statistics of Crime in ENCYC. CRIMINOLOGY 478 (1949).
21. PRISONERS AND JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1910).
22. JUDICIAL CRIMINAL STATISTICS 59 (1936).
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intoxicated, 6.5%-74.2%; disorderly conduct and vagrancy, 4.0%-
57.3%; gambling, 36.9%o--95.2%.23 Unfortunately, the age of these re-
ports limits their value severely.
The most helpful recent figures on use of fines are those published in
the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts. Like the surveys aforementioned, this publication
contains no information concerning the fine as a punishment in addition to
imprisonment. The following figures are, however, pertinent: 24
Percent of Those
Convicted and
Sentenced Who
Were Punished
Offense Solely by Fine
Antitrust violations ................................ 92.7
Fair Labor Standards Act ........................... 92.4
Motor Carrier Act ................................. 91.7
Migratory bird laws ............................... 91.2
Food and Drug Act ................................ 84.8
OPA-OHE price and rent control ................... 62.5
Lottery ........................................... 25.0
Fraud ............................................ 12.4
Indian liquor laws ................................. 10.1
A ssault ........................................... 10.0
Liquor, Internal Revenue ........................... 7.2
Theft ............................................ 4.0
Perjury .......................................... 3.3
Extortion ......................................... 3.0
Embezzlement ..................................... 2.6
Nationality laws ................................... 2.4
W hite slave traffic ................................. 1.9
Forgery .......................................... .9
Counterfeiting .................................... . .6
Narcotics, total ................................... . .5
Immigration laws .................................. .4
Juvenile delinquency ................................ .3
Transportation of stolen property .................... . .2
Transportation of stolen motor vehicles ................ .1
Percent of Those Convicted and Sentenced for All Offenses
Who Were Punished Solely by Fine ................ 9.025
23. Id. at 82. This survey has been discontinued. A survey of fines in the counties
of several states is available in JuDIcIAL CRiMINAL STATISTICS, OHIO, MINNESOTA,
AND THE Disjrcr OF COLUMBIA (1938).
24. REP. DIRECTOR ADmiN. OFFICE UNITED STATES CTS. 178, 179 (1950). Per-
centages (to the first decimal) deduced from figures therein. Where the total number
convicted is small, the representativity of the percentile figure is, of course, quite
questionable.
25. juvenile delinquents are excluded; other sentences, some of which are not set
forth in the above abstract, are included.
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It should be noted that: (1) In those types of offenses for which fines are
used more than infrequently, they are used to very great extent. (2) In
many of those areas in which they are used most frequently, most defend-
ants probably are corporations.2 6 (3) Several of the offenses for which
fines are most often used are "white collar" crimes 7  (4) Fines are used
repeatedly for violation of the lottery statutes, and rarely for juvenile
delinquents.
28
Just as fines are more frequently authorized for minor offenses than
for major ones, they are more frequently used for the former than for the
latter. Of 1,069,929 defendants found guilty of summary offenses and
misdemeanors in magistrates' courts in New York City in 1950, 994,036
or 92.9% were sentenced to fine only. Fines were often used in the fol-
lowing offenses: disorderly conduct, 26.3%; peddling and loitering, 54.2%o;
violation of sanitary laws, 96.1%o; traffic offenses, 97.7%; gambling, 73.7o.
Fines were rarely used for vagrancy and prostitution and not at all for
drug addiction. 9 The Court of Special Sessions in the same city imposed
a fine as sole punishment in 47.5% of the general misdemeanor cases.
Almost half of these convictions were for gambling misdemeanors, 87.2o
of those sentences being fine alone. 24.9% of shoplifting sentences were
fine alone, as were 5.7% of sentences for possession of habit-forming drugs
(in contrast to the absence of sentences to fine alone in drug addiction cases
in the magistrates' courts). 8°
There are few statistics showing how often fines are imposed in addi-
tion to imprisonment. Of the previously mentioned 1,069,929 convictions
in New York City magistrates' courts, only 523 resulted in fine plus im-
prisonment, 333 of these being imposed for violations of traffic laws.3 '
Since most of these convictions were disposed of by sentence to fine alone,
this figure is of very little aid in determining the extent to which fines are
used when a sentence to imprisonment is also imposed. A survey of true
bills returned in the January term, 1950, in which convictions were obtained
before the Court of Quarter Sessions in Philadelphia 32 indicates that of
26. Directors, officers, and agents of corporations may be imprisoned for violation
of the antitrust laws by the corporation if they authorize, order or do any of the acts
constituting the violation. 38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1946). All offenses
listed in the abstract can be punished by imprisonment except violations of the Motor
Carrier Act.
27. See Sutherland, The White Collar Criminal in ENcYc. CRIMINOLOGY 511
(1949) ; HAIL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 373 (1947).
28. The idea of punishment (by fine or any other type of sentence) is viewed as
inconsistent with juvenile court procedure. TEETERS AND REINEMANN, CHALLENGE
OF DELINQUENCY 331 (1950).
29. Percentages deduced from REi'. MAISTRATES' CTs. CITY OF NEW YORK 8-12
(1950).
30. Percentages deduced from RiP. CT. SPECIAL SEssIoNs CITY OF NEw YoRic
20, 21 (1949).
31. REP. MAGISTRATES' CTS. CITY OF NEW YORK 8-12 (1950).
32. Conducted by Messrs. Thomas Meehan and Robert Scott, assisted by Messrs.
Warren Malloy, William March, Gerald Mongelli, Eugene Rotberg, and William
Thatcher, members of the second year class of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School.
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880 dispositions, 231 were sentenced to fine. Of this number, ten were
to fine and imprisonment, these ten being almost completely in liquor and
lottery cases.P However, the representativity of these figures is neces-
sarily limited since they cover only one month of bills. In 1910, 19.7%
of all sentences to prison in the United States included an additional penalty
of fine.34  Nothing has been found to indicate whether that ratio still
prevails.
Pennsylvania figures are particularly interesting because of the com-
prehensive statutory authorization of fines in that jurisdiction. In 1949,
26.1% of total sentences were to fine only; 32.4% were to imprisonment. 5
Sentences to fine only for some of the more serious offenses were as
follows: manslaughter, 8.3%; larceny (excluding auto theft), 6.8%;
embezzlement and fraud, 14.8%o; rape, 5.3%o; sex offenses (excluding rape
and commercialized vice), 24.1%; gambling, 69.5%; abortion, 23.8%o;
arson, 237.36
It is probable that the ratio of fine only to total sentences for a specific
offense varies considerably, at least for some crimes, from judge to judge.
A ten year study made in New Jersey shows a range of 0.2% for one judge
to 1.5% for another in crimes involving property, of 0.0% to 1.37 in
crimes involving property and violence, of 0.0% to 9.87 in sex crimes,
of 13.3% to 46.77 for liquor law violations.37 The existetice of such varia-
tions, the extent of authorized and actual use of the fine, and the im-
portance of the nature of the sentence to the individual defendant as well as
to society demand that the factors determining whether and when the fine
is to be used should be delineated.
THE FINE POTENTIAL
A. The Aims of the Criminal Law
The character of the sentence should depend upon the purposes to be
fulfilled through its imposition. It is necessary, therefore, to make at least
a cursory examination of the fine in relation to the ends of retribution,
33. Five more sentences were to fine and imprisonment, but senterce was sus-
pended. The total number of fines includes payments to the use of the county. Such
payments technically are not fines; they were authorized in connection with proba-
tion, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1051 (Purdon 1930), to avoid a holding that if a de-
fendant were fined and placed on probation he could not subsequently be sentenced
further for violating the terms of his probation. Commonwealth v. Ciccone, 84 Pa.
Super. 224 (1924). See Commonwealth ex rel. Paige v. Smith, 130 Pa. Super. 536.
539, 198 Ad. 812, 814 (1938). The total number of fines does not include the frequent
sentences to imprisonment plus a fine of one cent .and costs. No reason for the im-
position of these one cent fines has been found.
34. Percentages deduced from PRISONERS AND JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE
UNITED STATEs 41 (1910).
35. Percentages deduced from STATISTICAL REP. DEaT W=ARE 63 (1950).
Imprisonment figure excludes suspended sentences and includes commitments to homes
for juvenile delinquents.
36. Ibid.
37. Gaudet, Sentencing Behaz4or of the Judge in ENcYC. CRIMINOLOGY 449, 455
(1949). That these variations occur is demonstrated also by the survey of thirty
states mentioned in the text at note 22.
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deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation. If retribution alone is con-
sidered, the problem of when to employ the fine will be narrowly delimited;
for all that will have to be ascertained is whether the punishment fits the
crime. Thus, it may be thought peculiarly appropriate that a fine be im-
posed when greed is a motivation.38 For example, in Britain during World
War II, illegal dealings in currency were punishable by a fine the size of
which depended upon the amount of currency involved in the offense.39
It is difficult to assign any great deterrent power to a fine imposed in
addition to imprisonment: if imprisonment is insufficient to deter, it is
doubtful whether the addition of a fine will restrain the potential offender
(except possibly when the term is extremely short and the fine extremely
large, greed being the chief motive for the crime); if imprisonment is suffi-
cient to deter, a fine is not required.4
However, the imposition of a fine as the sole penalty probably has
some deterrent effect, 41 especially when avarice is a motive. It is impos-
sible to make an accurate measurement of the deterrent value of the fine
since only the number of persons who have not been dissuaded can be
ascertained. This difficulty is merely one aspect of the general problem of
determining the efficacy of all criminal sanctions: the alleged efficacy usually
is not susceptible to conclusive proof. Rising rates of crime may warrant
an inference that present penalties are proving ineffective; on the other
hand, the fact that large segments of the populace continue to refrain from
illegal conduct may justify tempering that conclusion. Certainly the lack
of evidence does not permit more concerted criticism, with regard to deter-
rence, of the fine than of any other penalty. Furthermore, it is important
to recognize that no sanction can deter when the cause of the crime is such
that the offender has had no choice between willing and not willing the
offense. In this situation, again, no more can be expected, deterrence-wise,
from the fine than from other sanctions.
The deterrent power of the fine as the sole penalty for an offense will
depend upon a multiplicity of factors, among which are:
(a). What the law is attempting to deter. According to Bentham's
"hedonistic calculus," the potential offender will be dissuaded from action
whenever the pleasure of the offense is offset by the pain of punishment.42
Although this theory is quite vulnerable to attack, it seems certain that
38. 1 ACTFS DU CONGRkS PtNITENTIAIBE INTERNATIONAL DE BUDAPEST 64 (1905)
(hereinafter referred to as AcREs). See TEETERS, DELIBERATIONS OF THE INT.R-
NATIONAL PENAL AND PENITENTIARY CONGRESSES 118 (1949).
39. See McKenna, Reflections Upon Penalties, 110 JUST. P. 401 (1946).
40. Of course, the validity of the deterrence theory has been repeatedly questioned.
See, e.g., Lukas, Crime Prevention in CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION 397 (Tappan ed.
1951). For an espousal of the theory, see MICHAEL AND WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ADMINISTRATION 4-17 (1940). For an excellent discussion, see Andenaes, Gen-
eral Prevention--Illuion or Reality?, 43 J. Cgr n. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 176 (1952).
41. See United States v. Doe, 101 F. Supp. 609, 613 (D. Conn. 1951).
42. Tappan, Objectives and Methods in Correction in CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION
7 (Tappan ed. 1951). Compare Bentham's theory with Andenaes' description of
Feurbach's "psychologcal coercion." Andenaes, supra note 40 at 179.
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deterrence is more likely to occur when there is a wide disparity between
the expected punishment and the expected pleasure (the former being the
greater) than when the two are more nearly equal. For example, it has
been stated that in Philadelphia many sex offenders are fined not pri-
marily with the hope of preventing the offense, but with the hope of de-
terring solicitation and commission of the prohibited acts in public places.
It is claimed that the policy has produced successful results.43 Here, it
might be argued that the penalty is sufficient to effect a substitution of
public by a private place (a perhaps minimal diminution of pleasure) al-
though it would be insufficient to prevent the offense itself.
(b). The amount of the fine. It is necessary that legislatures peri-
odically raise the statutory maximum to account for dollar depreciation
and general income rises since the enactment of the statute. Such action
is, unfortunately, rarely taken. For example, in Pennsylvania some fines
are still expressed in terms of British pounds." Furthermore, to avoid
the appearance and effect of licensing in crimes such as gambling and to
achieve greater deterrent effect in all crimes, fines if used for recidivists
should be successively increased for each offense.45 Many judges practice
this policy regularly, and such gradations are sometimes specifically re-
quired by statute." Whatever the practice, it is essential that the fine be
sufficiently large to have more than nuisance value to the offender. Thus
the size of defendant's income is pertinent: a five dollar fine for jay-walking
is more likely to dissuade the mendicant than the millionaire.
(c). Collection. Atual collection of the fine is necessary in order to
ensure certainty of punishment, which, of course, increases deterrence.
Statistics reveal that the cities of New York and Philadelphia have been
alert to this necessity. Of $730,775 in fines imposed by the Court of Special
Sessions of New York City in 1950, $656,015 were collected.47  The spot
check of the Philadelphia Quarter Sessions Court, mentioned previously,4"
disclosed that $25,003 was collected out of $28,463 levied. Federal figures,
however, have been less favorable. 49  Moreover, not only must the fine be
paid, it must, for greatest effect, be paid by the offender himself; for, unlike
most criminal penalties, the fine enables the defendant to transfer punish-
ment to anotherY°
43. For a description of Philadelphia criminal procedure for abnormal sex
offenders, see the Legal Intelligencer, Dec. 11, 1950, p. 1, col. 1.
44. See, e.g., PA. STAT. tit. 47, § 665 (Purdon 1952). See also Fines and
the Changing Value of Money, 72 SOL. J. 734 (1928) and The Adequacy of Fines, 96
JUST. P. 399 (1932).
45. See note 5 supra.
46. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANlx. tit. 76, §248 (Purdon 1939).
47. REP. CT. SPECIAL SESSIONS CITy OF NEw YORx 28 (1950).
48. See text at note 32 supra.
49. $2,114,119.12 collected out of $6,626,433.11 imposed. Ras,. ATr'Y GENg. 86
(1941).
50. HALL, op. cit. supra note 27,, at 321.
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It seems that the fine produces no rehabilitation unless that term be
defined to include expiation and/or intimidation (i.e., the use of a penalty
to deter the offender from repeating his offense, rather than to deter others
from committing it). A probation officer has suggested that there are
many persons who, possibly because of a Mammonish philosophy, must
expiate themselves through financial loss. Thus, a robber who had spent
fifteen months in prison felt that he had not completely atoned for taking
$7.60 until he had made 76 trips to his parole office at ten cents car-
fare a trip.5 1
With regard to intimidation, it may be that mercenary offenders,
penalized in the pocketbook (where the pain is greatest), will be influenced
not to repeat because they simply cannot afford it. To some extent at
least, such intimidative effects can be measured by determining the num-
ber of persons sentenced to fine who do not recidivate. Thus, the same
probation officer speaks encouragingly of fines used in connection with
probation:
"It was only in 1945 that we persuaded our judges to experiment
with the idea of installment fines in selected cases. Prior to 1945 our
rate for recidivism had been well over 10 per cent. Since 1945 the
rate has fallen away down to 5 per cent at the moment. The singular
fact is that in fine cases the rate for recidivism is zero-believe it or
not. There were other factors, of course, besides the fines which have
contributed to the good showing in these cases. Nevertheless, you
couldn't convince us that the fines haven't helped." 52
On the other hand, an early survey (made in Springfield, Illinois, in 1914)
has minimized the intimidative effects of the fine.P It is noteworthy that
there apparently was no cobrdination of the fine and probation in the cases
which were examined in the Illinois study.
5 4
Of course, such surveys cannot produce conclusive results since
offenders may refrain from repetition for a variety of reasons. Further-
more, their later offenses may go undetected. Nevertheless, if it appears
that when fines are used for certain offenses repetitions are infrequent, there
will be good reason for extending use of the fine in those areas and ex-
perimenting with it in others.
As incapacitation is commonly identified with physical confinement, it
is not attainable through fining.55
The following conclusions may now be stated: (1) If retribution is
accepted as a valid aim of criminal law, the fine may be used to achieve it.
51. Quoted in DRESSLER, PRO1ATION AND PAROLE 93-94 (1951).
52. Letter, dated 6 March 1953, to the U. OF PA. L. REv.
53. Potter, Fines and Community Protection in Springfield, Illinois, 6 J. CRal.
L. & ClumoNoLon 675 (1916).
54. See text at note 120 infra for discussion of co6rdination of the fine with
probation.
55. MICHAEL AND WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 40, at 4.
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(2) The fine probably has deterrent effect, difficult of measurement, if
properly applied in certain areas only. (3) The fine may have intimidative
effects which are more capable of discernment. Although these conclusions
may furnish some guidance in determining whether or not a fine shall be
imposed in a specific instance, other factors must be adduced if a more
rational justification for the use of fines is to be achieved.
B. Relation to Prison and Commitment for Nonpayment
A recognized reason for the imposition of the fine as the sole penalty
for an offense is the desire to avoid imprisoning the offender. So con-
ceived, the fine is largely a negative measure. For example: it is often
used for first offenders, with whom the court, believing repetition to be
unlikely, may be lenient; for sex offenders, whom prison authorities do
not want; for corporation officials, guilty of "white collar" crimes; and,
for gamblers and other offenders whose acts are not regarded by com-
munity mores as sufficiently evil to merit prison sentence, despite the
contrary pronouncement of the legislature.
However, in practice the imposition of a fine frequently results in
incarceration, the very end it was designed to avoid; for most jurisdic-
tions, either by mandatory 5 or discretionary 57 provisions, authorize com-
mitment for failure to pay the fine. Thus, after a legislative or judicial
decision that a defendant shall not be sent to prison,5 8 he is committed for
nonpayment, even though imprisonment for debt has been abolished in
most jurisdictions. 59 An alleviating factor is that, ordinarily, statutes
authorize the release of the prisoner after a specified time (usually 20 to
30 days) if he takes the pauper's oath.60 The confinement is justified not
as a punishment but as a means of coercing payment.0 1 However, there
can be no doubt that, especially under the common type of statute regulat-
ing length of commitment by the amount of the fine,6 the incarceration is
punitive rather than coercive: if defendant is unable to pay, deprivation of
liberty cannot force him to.P The penal nature of the confinement is par-
56. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 6, § 65 (Supp. 1951).
57. See, e.g., IowA CoDE c. 789, § 17 (1950).
58. It can be argued that there is no decision that defendant shall not be sent to
prison, but merely a decision that he shall not be sent if he pays his fine. It is sug-
gested, however, that (barring the case where defendant can well afford to pay a fine
but refuses to do so) whether or not a man merits or requires imprisonment is a ques-
tion which should be determined on grounds other than his wealth.
59. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §257 (Purdon 1953).
60. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 23, §§ 23-25 (1944).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Ridgewood Garment Co., 44 F. Supp. 435 (E.D.
N.Y. 1942). In the Philadelphia survey mentioned in the text at note 32, a case was
found in which defendant was sentenced to imprisonment and fine. The court sus-
pended the prison sentence, placed defendant on six months probation, and then im-
mediately committed him for nonpayment of the fine! This was an improper use of
the commitment as the punishment itself and/or an action totally inconsistent with the
previous decision that defendant should not be imprisoned.
62. See, e.g., IowA CODE c. 789, § 17 (1950).
63. WINES, PUNISHMENT AND REFOntATION 216 (1910).
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ticularly evident when the offense is one for which the court may not im-
prison the offenders (for example, most misdemeanors) and when the
prisoner is required to work out the fine during his commitment.6 Thus, in
many instances, the fine favors the solvent offender in a very real way.
In addition to its discriminatory aspects, confinement for nonpayment of
a fine subjects the defendant to all the evils of short-term imprisonment:
(1) Even if it is assumed that prison can be reformative, the time limit
makes rehabilitative measures impossible. (2) The institutions in which
the term is served are frequently ill-equipped, crowded and unsanitary.
(3) In being committed for nonpayment, many defendants incur the social
stigma of prison for the first time. (4) Because most commitments are
to county prisons, in which there is little or no segregation of prisoners,
defendants may be contaminated by association with more experienced
criminals. (5) The absence of defendants may affect the economic status
and the morale of their families. (6) The danger of recidivism may be
increased by the difficulties defendants will undergo when seeking to re-
adjust themselves upon discharge.65
There are no recent nationwide figures on commitments for nonpay-
ment of fine. The 1910 census showed that 56.5% of the total number of
prisoners and juvenile delinquents committed during that year were com-
mitted for failing to pay fines. Of the total numer of persons in prison
on January 1, 1910,9% had been confined for nonpayment of fines. 6  While
it is impossible to tell whether these ratios are still representative, it is
noteworthy that of 4,140 commitments after sentence to Reed Street Prison,
Philadelphia, from June 1, 1949, to May 31, 1950, 2,480 or 59.9% were
for nonpayment of fines.67 During that same period, the daily per capita
cost of imprisonment was $1.79.68 Thus, by committing for nonpayment,
the county not only lost the fines which it might have collected, but also
had to bear the expense of boarding the defaulters.6 9 There are several
means by which this result can be at least partially avoided.
1. Instalment Payments.-The first of these means is payment of
fines in instalments, a procedure recommended by the Seventh International
64. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 672 (1936); tit. 39, § 533 (1937); tit.
57, §20 (1950).
65. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PENAL AND PENITENTIARY COM-
mISSION 86 (1946) and BARNES AND TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 464
(2d ed. 1951). The Penal Commission was dissolved on October 1, 1951, since its
functions were being duplicated by a division of the United Nations Organization.
66. PRISONERS AND JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (1910).
The difference between the two figures is accounted for by the relatively brief duration
of commitments for nonpayment.
67. REP. PHILADELPHIA COUNTY PRIsoN 79 (1949).
68. Id. at 8.
69. Since the total man-days spent in prison by this class of offenders is not given,
the actual expense cannot be computed. It has been pointed out that this is probably
the only instance in which a debtor goes to board at his creditor's house if he is
unable to pay his debt. ROBINSON, JAILS 64 (1944).
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Penal and Penitentiary Congress."° At least ten states 71 make express pro-
vision for payment in instalments, such payments also being permitted
in the Federal Courts. 2 In still other jurisdictions, such as New York,
3
there are general provisions permitting the court to regulate time and man-
ner of payment, under which payment in instalments is permissible. 4  A
large degree of success has resulted from the use of this scheme: in Sweden,
commitments for nonpayment fell from 13,358 in 1932 to 286 in 1946; 7
in Britain, from an average of 83,187 for 1909-1913 to 2,667 in 1946.78
Thus, total commitments for nonpayment in the entire nation of Great
Britain in that year were only a few more than those to Reed Street
Prison, Philadelphia, alone, in 1949.77 In West Virginia, a judge has
found that, even in the midst of the depression, only 5% of those allowed
to pay by instalment had to be committed, and has maintained that with
adequate probation facilities even better results could be achieved.
78
The advantages of this system are several: (1) avoidance of the evils
of short-term imprisonment; (2) actual collection of more fines, thus in-
creasing the retributive and deterrent effects of the penalty and adding to
revenues; (3) decrease of mounting prison maintenance expenses; 19 (4)
probable decrease in cost of aid given prisoners' families by welfare depart-
ments. Administrative expenses of the instalment plan should be offset
by these savings; even if not, financial considerations must not be para-
mount when it is possible to keep men out of prison.80 To reduce com-
mitments to a minimum, it should not be lawful to confine a defendant
70. 1 AcrEs (BUDAPEST) 64 (1905). See TEETERS, DELIBERATIONS OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL PENAL AND PENITENTIARY CONGRESS 118 (1949).
71. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1205 (Deering 1949); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws
arLt 52, §17 (1951); MASS. ANN. LAws c. 279, §lA (1933); MICH. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28, § 1075 (1938); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 953-956 (Purdon 1930);
S.C. CODE § 55-593 (1952) ; UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 77 c. 35, § 17 (1953) ; REv. CODE
WASH. §9.92.070 (1951); Wis. STAT. c. 57, §.04 (1947); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN.
c. 10, § 1905 (1945).
72. 18 U.S.C. §3651 (1946). In the federal courts and in Michigan, South
Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, the pertinent statute specifically authorizes
use of the instalment plan in connection with probation.
73. N.Y. Csit. CODE § 483.
74. See People ex rel. Decker v. Page, 125 N.Y. Misc. 538, 540, 211 N.Y. Supp.
401, 403 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (decided under the predecessor of statute in note 73 supra).
75. SELLrN, RECENT PENAL LEGISLATION IN SWEDEN 14 (1947). The drop was
due both to the instalment plan and to the fact that no defendant is committed unless
he wilfully refuses to pay or cannot do so because of his own negligence.
76. Cordes, Fines and Their Enforcement in 2 J. Cglm. Scr. 46 (Radzinowicz and
Turner ed. 1950). Part of these decreases is probably due to the fact, previously
mentioned, that statutory maxima tend to remain constant despite dollar depreciation
and income increases. Instalment payments were authorized in Britain in 1879, but
little use was made of them until 1914. Id. at 47.
77. See text at note 67 supra.
78. Binford, Instalment Collection of Fines, PRoc. CONG. AmER. PRISON Ass'N
361 (1937). See also PAYMENT OF FINES IN INSTALMENTS, CHICAGO MUN. REF.
LIaa. BULL.. no. 4 (1914).
79. For the fiscal year 1950, per capita cost of imprisonment in federal institutions
was $1,144.27. REP. DIREcToR ADmiN. OFFICE UNITED STATES CTs. 64 (1950).
80. PEARS, PRISONS AND REFORmATORIES 413 (1872) (transactions, in English,
of the First International Penal and Penitentiary Congress).
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if he defaults in his instalments unless the court specifically so states when
passing sentence.81 In the event of default, defendant should not be com-
mitted immediately but should be permitted to appear and show cause
why he should not be confined.Y In addition, the sentencing court should
have power to remit the fine.8 3 Complete abolition of the power to com-
mit is not desirable since the judiciary must be left a means of coercing
those who wilfully refuse to pay. For this reason, the power has been
retained in the American Law Institute's Youth Correction Authority
Act.8
2. "Day-fines."-Another means of eliminating commitment for non-
payment of a fine is initially fixing one which defendant can afford to pay.
Excessive fines have been prohibited by the English Bill of Rights, the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and most
state constitutions.8 5  There appear to be no additional limitations on the
desires of the legislature. Imposition of a fine according to defendant's
wealth was practiced as early as the thirteenth century 8 6 and was later
advocated by Montesquieu,8 7 Bentham 88 and Lombroso.8 9 At the Sixth
International Penal and Penitentiary Congress, Brussels, 1900, du Mouceau,
Procurator of France, pointed out that when a laborer is fined the equiva-
lent of three days' wages, equity and efficiency of sentence require that a
wealthy man be fined three days' income for the same offense. 0 Legisla-
tion embodying this theory has been enacted in Finland (1921), 1,- Cuba
81. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1205 (Deering Supp. 1951).
82. Ibid. It is frequently the practice in Philadelphia to issue at the time of sen-
tence a bench warrant which is executed without hearing if default occurs. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 956 (Purdon 1930).
83. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 798. Although the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania has indicated that the courts do not have the power to remit a fine, Common-
wealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain, 345 Pa. 581, 589, 28 A.2d 897, 902 (1942), there is
considerable difference of opinion as to whether (and when) they may do so. The
survey mentioned in the text at note 32 revealed that some Philadelphia judges have
remitted fines in whole or in part.
84. YOUTH CORm icoN AUTHRmTY Act § 15 (1940).
85. See, e.g., PA. CONST. Art. I, § 13. Section 20 of the Magna Carta of 1215
prohibits only excessive amercements. For the distinction between amercements and
fines and for an exhaustive historical survey of the fine, see Fox, CONTEMPT OF
COURT 118 et seq. (1927).
86. In England, the amount of an amercement was fixed by the offender's neigh-
bors with regard to his wealth. The House of Lords fixed the amercement of a Duke
at 10, that of an Earl at f5. Fox, op. cit. supra note 85, at 126-7.
87. 1 MONTESQUEu, SPIRIT or LAWS 100 (3d ed. 1762).
88. BENTHAMS, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 353 (Ogden ed. 1931).
89. Loivsaoso, CRIME: ITS CAUSES AND REMEDIES 389 (1911).
90. 1 ACrES (BRuxELLEs) 98 (1900). See BARNES AND TEETERS, NEw HoRIzoNs
IN CRIMINOLOGY 824 (2d ed. 1951).
91. Finland: Law of May 21, 1921, [1923] SUPPLEMENT TILL FINLANDS RIKES LAG
N:o 36, § 4.
"A fine is imposed in the form of a fine per diem. The least fine is a one-day-fine;
the highest is 300 per diem fines, unless' the fines are combined.
"In imposing a fine the Court shall after free deliberation determine, according to
the average daily income which the person to be fined has or could have at that time,
and taking into consideration his financial status, his obligation to support his family
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(1938),92 and Sweden (1948).93 Similar provisions were included in
the Mexican Code of 1929, but are no longer in force.94
As enacted, the theory is two-fold: a fine is expressed in units, their
number varying between the minimum and maximum numbers prescribed
for the offense. In this manner, distinctions in punishment according to
the nature of the offense are preserved. The monetary value of the unit,
upon which a minimum and maximum are also set, is determined by con-
sidering the wealth of the defendant, his daily income, his productive
capacity, and the number of his dependents. In this manner, distinctions
in punishment according to the economic status of the offender are achieved.
In Sweden, the number of "day-fines" authorized for an offense is from
one to 120; the amount of each unit or "day-fine" may vary from five to
300 crowns. At the present rate of exchange, 95 therefore, fines may range
in amount from $0.97 to $6,984.00. For identical offenses, each meriting
the greatest number of units, the fine can vary according to defendant's
fortune from $116.40 to $6,984.00.
as well as other facts that might have an effect on his ability to pay, what sum of
money shall be considered as his per diem fine.
"In the place of fines of fixed sums of money . . . fines per diem shall be im-
posed, however, not exceeding the sum mentioned in the first paragraph, and a fine not
exceeding 10 markkas shall be considered as a fine per diem. If the fine exceeds
this, one per diem fine for each full ten markkas shall be added to the punishment."
Translation by the Embassy of Finland. See Arvelo, Orn Dagsbotssystemet i Finland,
16 NoRDIS TnDssmIuFT FOR STRAFF=RT 12 (1928).
92. Cuba: C6DIGO DE DEFENSA SocIAl art. 59, §§ A-E (1938). "A. The personal
fine will consist in the payment, by the guilty party, of the quantity of money which
shall be determined by the sentence, which shall be not less, in any case, than SCf
centavos, nor more than 20,000 pesos. B. The personal fines shall be formed by
daily quotas which shall be determined by the Tribunal within the limits which are
fixed in each case, keeping in mind the fortune of the culprit, the daily wage or income
which he receives, his ability for work, or his productive capacity, his obligations as
a private citizen and the other circumstances which control his ability to pay, without,
whenever possible, prejudice to his own indispensable expenditures and those of
the persons for whom he is civilly responsible. C. In the case where the culprit
lacks goods or income or may not be working or gaining any salary at the time of
judgment, the quota will be determined taking into account the salary or daily wage
that he may eventually earn. D. When the culprit never shall have earned a wage
or salary and shall lack income or goods, the quota shall be determined by the
mean amount which, according to his class and personal social position, the workers
earn who live in the locality where the crime was committed. E. In no case shall
the daily quota be less than $0.50 nor greater than $20.00" Translation by the De-
partment of Romance Languages, University of Pennsylvania.
93. Sweden: Law of June 30, 1948, [1949] SVEMGES RiKES LAG, STRAFF-LAG
Rap. 2, § 8. "Fines are imposed as day fines. The number of day fines is deter-
mined by the character of the crime and shall be no less than one and no more than one
hundred and twenty, where there are no circumstances as provided in Chapter 4,
section 28. The day fine is fixed at an amount of money from one crown up to three
hundred crowns, as is proved to be reasonable with respect to the income, wealth,
responsibility of support, and general economic situation of the defendant. If the
crime is insignificant the amount of the day fine may be adjusted accordingly. The
smallest fine shall be five crowns." Translation by Mr. Theodore Sellin.
94. "The unit of the fine is the daily profit. The entire fine shall express itself
by a multiple of this unit; but at no time shall exceed one hundred days." [from art.
83] "The daily profit is understood, through the effects of this Code, as being the
quantity which an individual obtains each day through salaries, wages, rents, interests,
emoluments or otherwise." [from art. 84] Quoted in 2 TEJERA Y GA1cfA, COMEN-
TARIOS AL C6DIGO DE 'DEFENSA SOCIAL 297 (1945). Translation by the Department
of Romance Languages, University of Pennsylvania.
95. The Swedish crown was worth $0.194 on March 4, 1953.
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Of course, practical difficulties will be encountered in determining the
offender's ability to pay. Information on his economic status may be in-
cluded in the pre-sentence report if one is used. His earnings can be
checked through his employer. Although present federal income tax regu-
lations on publicity of returns are stringent, 96 they can be altered to permit
inspection by the courts. If the offender wishes to avoid the maximum fine,
he can be required to submit a copy of his return and to file an affidavit
completely describing his assets, a conscious misstatement making him
guilty of perjury.
Advantages of the "day-fine" system are numerous: (1) Fines are im-
posed more equitably. (2) Since they are levied according to wealth,
there is a greater probability of actual payment and, thus, of increased
revenues. (3) Whatever deterrent effects fines have will be augmented,
especially in regard to the wealthy but also for all persons, because of
the increased certainty of collection. (4) Although some or all of these
standards (wealth, income, productive capacity and dependents) are con-
sciously or unconsciously applied at the present time by many judges on
a "hunch" basis, this type of statute specifies them concretely and forces
all courts to take cognizance of them. Flexibility of sentence is retained
and even expanded by allowing both the gravity of the offense and the
particular status of the offender to be considered. Failing the establish-
ment of this plan, present maxima should be raised to permit under the
existing system, in the discretion of the court, greater differentiations ac-
cording to wealth in the amount of the fine.
97
C. Secondary Ends
Employment of the fine, to avoid imprisonment seems proper when
incapacitation is not required to protect the community; the practices of
instalment payments and imposition of fines according to ability to pay
are efficacious means to that end. HoweVer, nothing has been educed
thus far to support a preference of the fine over other non-incapacitating
sanctions. It is pertinent, therefore, to examine what are usually con-
sidered as secondary ends of the fine: revenue, compensation of victims, and
inducement to law enforcement or crime solution. These ends are similar
in that they all contemplate imposition of the fine in order to dispose of the
proceeds in a particular manner.
1. Revenue.-That fines do produce considerable revenues is demon-
strated by the amount of dollars collected annually in different jurisdic-
tions.98 It is frequently claimed that the revenue function is particularly in
96. 53 STAT. 29 (1939), as amended, 54 STAT. 1008 (1940), 55 STAT. 722 (1941),
26 U.S.C. § 55 (1948).
97. It has been proposed that maximum fines be readjusted so that offenses
punishable by the same number of years will also be punishable by the same amount
of fine. REP,. CRmmEs Stmvzy Com. LAW Ass'x PHiLA. 47 (1926).
98. See text at notes 47 and 48 supra.
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evidence in smaller counties,9 9 especially as a substitute for higher taxation.
It has been suggested, however, that the state has no right to reimburse
itself for the expenses of administration of criminal law, since that ad-
ministration is a social necessity.100 This suggestion seems especially valid
when the state is enriched at the expense of victims whom it has failed
to protect.' 0 '
2. Reward and Inducement.-It was long the custom in England to
apportion the proceeds of the fine between the state and an informer to
aid in discovering and apprehending offenders..0 2  The practice has been
followed to a limited extent in this country, usually with regard to minor
offenses only.'4 3 There have been, however, societal objections to reward-
ing informers: for example, the reward may induce false witnesses to con-
spire against the innocent.'0 4 In addition, this division of proceeds is some-
times used to ensure law enforcement: for example, by promise of one-
half of the amount realized, private citizens are induced to sue to collect a
fine to which a public official's failure to enforce the law has made him
subject.1'
3. Compensation.--The practice that has been most frequently sug-
gested and infrequently used is the creation of a fund from the proceeds
of fines to indemnify the victims of crime. Such a fund existed in the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilys and in the Duchy of Tuscany.10 6 A similar
plan, originally proposed by Edward Livingston for Louisiana'"o and by
Macaulay for the Indian Penal Code,' 08 contemplates payment of the fine
directly to the victim rather than into a fund. The merits of the fund
theory were debated extensively at the Sixth International Penal and
Penitentiary Congress in 1900, but there has been little discussion of it
since that time. 0 9
99. See Commonwealth v. Cain, 345 Pa. 581, 603, 28 A.2d 877, 907 (1942).
100. 2 AcTEs (BRUXELLES) 5 (1900). For a report of the conclusions of this
Congress, see H.R. Doc. No. 374, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. (1903).
101. TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPHY 493 (1912).
102. 3 BL. CoMM. *161-*162.
103. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 590a (Deering 1949) (destroying highway guide-
posts) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1951 (leaving mail coach horses unattended), § 1952
(obstruction of highway by wagoner), § 3222 (miscellaneous offenses) (Purdon
1945) ; VA. CODE tit. 19, § 334 (1950) (clerk of court failing to report fines collected) ;
VT. Rxv. STAT. § 7829 (1947) (selling low-ignition illuminating oil). See also 53
STAT. 440 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § 3716(b) (1940), which, somewhat analogously, awards
one-half of any civil penalty recovered to the informer when there has been a wilful
failure to report income from illegally produced petroleum.
104. For a criticism of this objection, see BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF REWARD 100
et seq. (1825).
105. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 14, § 293 (1943).
106. 2 AcTEs (BRUXELLES) 91 (1900). This information was presented in
Garofalo's report; an English translation may be found in GAROFALO, CRIMINOLOGY
419, 434 (1914).
107. 2 AcTES (BRUXELLES) 22 (1900). This information was presented in Prof.
Simeon Baldwin's report. For an English translation, see SEN. Doc. No. 158, 55th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1899).
108. 7 MACAULAY, Misc. WORxs 237 (no date).
109. 1 AcrEs (BRuXELLES) 91-127 (1900) ; 2 id. at 1-153. See also BARNES AND
TEETERS, NEW HoRIzoNS IN CRIMINOLOGY 822 (2d ed. 1951).
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The theory is based upon the premises that crime wrongs the state
by violating the peace, and the victim by violating his person and/or prop-
erty; that the former necessitates punishment and the latter reparation;
that these two elements need not be distinct, even though they are sepa-
rated in the United States because of the different degrees of proof re-
quired. 11° Should the total proceeds be inadequate to cover all proved
claims,:1  a proportional allocation among claimants would be made.
m2
However, one view would allow this distribution only after a fixed sum
was deducted for the state's expenses." 3 Ferri would go so far as to
make the state an insurer against the injuries he claims it is obligated to
prevent: it would pay the victim an immediate satisfaction and then reim-
burse itself at the offender's expense, thus bearing the risk of his insol-
vency.114 Under any of these plans the offender could deduct from any
civil judgment secured against him by the victim the amount which plain-
tiff secured from the fund.1" Disposition of the proceeds to victims would
be made not only when the fine is the sole penalty but also when defend-
ant is sentenced to prison, "every such sentence to carry with it a fine." 6
Whether the state should provide complete insurance for victims of
crime is a question beyond the scope of this Note. Livingston's plan of pay-
ing the fine to the victim has obtained limited legislative approval in this
country: for example, in New York the entire fine paid by one held guilty
of criminal contempt is to be paid to the aggrieved party; " 7 in Massa-
chusetts half of the fine for one species of arson is to be paid to the victim."1
8
In many of these instances, unfortunately, the maximum fine is too low
to admit of substantial reparation. On the other hand, the fund theory ap-
parently has not received modern approval. However, this theory seems
more equitable than payment of the fine directly to the victim, for repara-
tion would not then be contingent upon whether the victim was fortunate
enough to be injured by a solvent offender.
The obvious danger of any compensation theory is that courts, desir-
ing to aid the injured, will impose large fines which offenders cannot pay.
Thus, under the present system of committing for nonpayment, imprison-
ment will result. This danger can be averted, however, if emphasis is
placed on the primary consideration of imposing a fine which defendant
can pay. When he cannot, and there is no reasonable certainty that he
will be able to in the near future, no fine should be imposed. Properly
110. 1 AcTEs (BRuxEuLEs) 9 (1900).
111. Evidence that the proceeds would be grossly inadequate was introduced.
Id. at 92.
112. 2 AcrEs (BRuXELES) 91 (1900).
113. Id. at 15.
114. FERRI, CPIMINAL SOCIOLOGY 513 (1917).
115. Under Livingston's plan, note 107 supra, it is probable that deduction from
the judgment of the amount of the fine also would be allowed.
116. 2 Acams (BRuxELLEs) 78 (1900).
117. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 773.
118. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 266, § 9 (1933).
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directed, compensation supplies a reasonable basis for preferring the fine
to other non-incapacitating sanctions if proceeds are sufficient to make more
than token reparation to the victim. Although current costs of crime
are astronomical, present proceeds are substantial 119 and should increase
if the instalment plan is generally used and if the fine is levied according
to the offender's ability to pay. Whether these proceeds will be sufficient
to justify continued existence of the fund should become apparent when
the experiment is attempted.
D. The Fine as a Supplement
It should be emphasized that the fine need not be preferred to the
exclusion of all other sanctions. For example, every sentence to im-
prisonment should carry an additional sentence of a fine (if defendant can
afford to pay it) even though the offense may have caused no financial
damage. Such a procedure will require, of course, statutory amendments
in many jurisdictions. These payments will reimburse the fund for grants
to the victims of insolvent offenders.
It is particularly important that the fine be co6rdinated with probation
wherever the latter is needed and the former is possible; for, as previously
stated, the few statistics available have demonstrated the efficacy of this
practice in selected cases. 120  It has been asserted that criminals whose
dominant characteristic is an "opportunist acquisitiveness" comprehend a
pecuniary penalty more readily than any other; and that "pseudo-alcoholics"
and playboys will be less likely to repeat when fines deprive them of the
wherewithal to pursue their pleasures. 1 21 Therefore, when such men are
adjudged deserving of probation, fines may be particularly helpful in effect-
ing reformation. Certain it is, however, that insensitive, repetitive empha-
sis on the necessity of payment may in some instances disturb that "deli-
cate case work relationship of confidence, sympathy and understanding,"
which, it is claimed, probation work attempts to establish.122  For that
reason alone, it is essential that the probation departments be vested with
the power of supervising payments by their charges, for these departments
are most competent to judge whether a fine continues to be beneficial in a
given instance. Where it does not, the probation officer should be author-
ized to recommend remission to the court. If this officer has no such
supervisory duties, he may suddenly discover that an otherwise rehabili-
tated probationer has been committed for nonpayment of his fine. There
have been vociferous objections to making collection agents out of pro-
bation officers.123 If these objections are primarily to the administrative
119. See text at notes 47 and 48 supra.
120. See text at note 52 supra; and see discussion in Cohen, The Integration of
Restitution in the Probation Services, 34 J. CRrM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315 (1943-44).
121. Letter quoted in DRESSLER, op. cit. supra note 51, at 94.
122. Cohen, Twilight Zones in Probation, 37 J. Cltt. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 288, 291
(1946-47).
123. Cohen, supra note 122 and YOUNG, SocIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND
DELINQUENCY 225 (2d ed. 1952).
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